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EQUAL PAY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND
EQUAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW FOR WOMEN
CARUTHERS GHOLSON BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
The right to work, I had assumed was the most precious liberty
that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he
has to live, to be free, to own property. It does many men little
good to stay alive and free and propertied, if they cannot work.
To work means to eat. It also means to live.'
It is hoped that Justice Douglas, the author of the above quote, used
the word "man" generically to include all human beings. In a democratic,
capitalistic system there is no more important right than the right of
an individual, whether man or woman, to work for a livelihood."
Women as well as men should have equal opportunities "to work,"
"to eat" and "to live." But this is not the case. Women are discriminated
against in employment by state governments whose legislatures have
passed laws barring them from certain employment. They are also dis-
criminated against by private employers, labor unions and employment
agencies in hiring, job placement and promotional opportunities. They
are even paid lower wages than men with whom they work side by side
on the same job. It was to remedy such rank injustices to American
women that two important laws were passed: the Equal Pay Act of
1963' and the sex discrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'
The Equal Pay Act, added as an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of
sex as follows:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this
* Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor. The views expressed in this ar-
ticle are those of the author and are not presented as the views of the Department of
Labor or any other government agency.
1. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
2. The courts have held that the right to work for a living is a fundamental right
which cannot be taken away by governmental action under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
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section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which
such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of
sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a
rate less than a rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsi-
bility, and which are performed under similar working conditions
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or equality of production; or (iv) a dif-
ferential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the pro-
visions of the subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.'
Subsection (2) of that Act prohibits discrimination by labor unions.
No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees
of an employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall cause or attempt to cause such employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of paragraph (1)
of this subsection.8
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, section 703(a), covers a much
wider range of discriminations.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.!
Sections 703(b) and 703(c) contain similar provisions prohibiting dis-
crimination by employment agencies and labor organizations.
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that laws enacted for the
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964).
6. Id. § 206(d) (2).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
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purpose of assuring fair treatment of employees are entitled to liberal
construction because of the underlying humanitarian and remedial pur-
poses. This principle is stated in Tennessee Coal & Iron R.R. v. Muscoda,
Local No. 123 :8
We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade
but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice
a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit
of others. Those are the rights that Congress has specially
legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or
applied in a narrow, grudging manner.'
The Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are thus
in the category of statutes which must be construed broadly so as to
advance their important purposes. The purpose of this article is to review
the legislative background and judicial construction of these two Acts.
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEED FOR LEGISLATION PROHIBITING
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
There is no logical justification for sex segregation in employment.
The earmarking by employers, unions and employment agencies of all
well-paid, interesting jobs as "male" jobs and most poorly-paid, tedious
jobs as "female" jobs is a cruel means of keeping women in a condition of
poverty and degradation. The difference in strength between an "average"
woman and an "average" man is not relevant in employment situations.
The heavier work is largely done by machinery. In today's economy,
able-bodied persons of both sexes can perform practically all jobs."
Furthermore, the relative strength of persons of both sexes varies so
greatly that only a system of job placement based on individual qualifica-
tions is non-discriminatory. It is a myth that certain jobs must be re-
served for "males only" because of their alleged superiority.
The Department of Labor's studies of approximately 75,000 job
situations rated those jobs in terms of required physical strength as
"sedentary," "light," "medium," "heavy" and "very heavy."" The low-
paid job of "charwoman," which is traditionally considered a "female"
job, was rated as "heavy"' 2 while highly paid "male" jobs such as a
8. 321 U.S. 590 (19W).
9. Id. at 597.
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF
OCCUPATIONS BY WORKER TRAITS AND OCCUPATIONAL STRENGTH (3d ed. 1968).
11. Id. at Supp. II to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
12. Id. at 89.
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"concrete-mixing truck driver"13 and "tower-excavator operator" are
rated as "light.""' The "male" job of "power shovel operator" is rated
as "medium."' " Very few jobs are rated as "heavy" and a negligible
number of them were listed as "very heavy."'"
The discrimination against women in employment originated in
ancient customs and traditions and has no modern day justification.
These discriminations have been perpetuated as a result of three factors:
1) the actions of employers who for economic self-interest wish to main-
tain lower wages for women so as to have a cheap, female labor pool for
employment in unpleasant, traditionally low-paid jobs ;17 2) the actions of
male dominated labor unions who wish to keep women ghettoized in
"female" jobs so as to reserve the better paid jobs for men;"8 and 3)
the actions of unenlightened state legislators and state labor commissions
who persist in enforcing anachronistic state laws restricting women in
employment.'"
The separate but unequal treatment of women in employment has
had brutal effects. Sex discrimination is a major basis for the national
poverty problem. Sixty-one percent of the nation's poor children live in
families headed by women.2" A comparison on the basis of sex and race
of Americans living in poverty shows that 53.2 percent of the families are
headed by non-white women, 25.2 percent of the families by white
women, 19.9 percent of the families by non-white men and 6.3 percent of
the families by white men.2' Obviously, sex discrimination as well ab
race discrimination is a national blight.2
13. Id. at 118.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 119. This government document makes no classification of jobs on the
basis of the sex of the persons usually engaged in them. It i's a matter of common
knowledge that the persons employed as charwomen would be women and that in our
present economy persons employed as concrete-mixing truck drivers, tower excavator
operators and power shovel operators are men.
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 10.
17. See notes 140-45, 192-206 inf ra and accompanying text.
18. In some cases employers and the unions representing their employees have
brazenly agreed to sex discrimination in their collective bargaining contracts, specifically
designating low paid jobs as "female" and the better jobs as "male." See Bowe v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
19. See Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal.),
vacated, 393 U.S. 83, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 993 (1968), rev'd & remanded, 437 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1971); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal.
1968), remanded, 3 F.E.P. Cas. 130 (9th Cir. 1971).
20. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet on the American Family in Poverty, April,
1968.
21. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: CPR-60, No. 68, Table D
1967.
22. See Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview,
5 VAL. U.L. REv. 237 (1971).
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Contrary to general belief, white women are the worst victims of
employment discrimination in professional and managerial positions.
Recent government statistics report the median earnings of year-round
professional and managerial workers in central cities as follows: white
men, $9,545; non-white women, $6,209; non-white men, $6,208 and
white women, $5,910.23 The median wage of women in general is only
58 percent of the median wage of men.2 ' The differentials mentioned
above cannot be justified on the ground that men are better educated than
women. White women earned less than men with inferior educations
regardless of race as demonstrated by a comparison of median wages of
women who have attended college and men who have finished no more
than the eighth grade: "White women with some college education,
$3082; non-white men with eighth grade education, $3735; white men
with eighth grade education, $4881.'' Women are a long, long way
from achieving equality in employment.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND THE SEX
DISCRIMINATION PROVISION OF TITLE VII
The Equal Pay Act and the sex discrimination provision of Title
VII were directed toward the same goal-the elimination of sex discrim-
ination in employment. Title VII was passed about a year after the
passage of the Equal Pay Act. Since feminists and their organizations
were simultaneously working for passage of these two acts, which had
common goals, the wealth of information on sex discrimination brought
before Congress as a result of legislative hearings on the Equal Pay Act
was influential in convincing Congress of the need for the sex discrimina-
tion provision of Title VII.26 Equal Pay bills had been introduced in
every Congress since 1945." The battle, still unwon, for the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Constitution had been waged in each Con-
gress for over forty years. 8 There were no legislative hearings on
the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, but the exploitation of
23. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Census: CPR-23, No. 27, 1967.
24. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACT SHEET ON THE EARNINGS GAP
(1970).
25. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Census: CPR-60, No. 60, 1967.
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
27. E.g., S. 2494, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; S. 3926, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
H.R. 394, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ; H.R. 59, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; S. 176,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) ; H.R. 3550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; S. 706, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949) ; S. 1556, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945).
28. See Eastwood, Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under the Consti-
tution, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 281 (1971).
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women in employment was such a well known fact in American life
that no hearings were necessary.
It was easier for women to achieve passage of the Equal Pay Act
since it covered a more limited area of discrimination than Title VII.
The discrimination is of the most obvious and blatant type--discrimina-
tion in wages between persons performing equal work for the same
employer in the same establishment. Furthermore, it was less con-
troversial. Male dominated unions were less enthusiastic about the sex
provision in Title VII because it permitted access to jobs for women
which had previously been monopolized by men. However, the Equal
Pay Act was considered innocuous since it had no such effect, and it
increased job security for men by discouraging the replacement of men
with lower paid women.
The legislative hearings and debates on the Equal Pay Act revealed
the severe plight of women in employment and motivated Congress to
pass both that Act and the sex discrimination provision of Title VII."
President John F. Kennedy summarized the conditions which necessitated
it as follows:
[T]he average woman worker earns only 60 percent["0 ] of the
average wage for men .... Our economy today depends upon
women in the labor force. One out of three workers is a woman.
Today, there are almost 25 million women employed, and their
number is rising faster than the number of men in the labor
force.["1] It is extremely important that adequate provisions
be made for reasonable levels of income to them, for the care
of the children ... and for the protection of the family unit ....
The lower the family income, the higher the probability that
the mother must work. Today one out of five of these working
mothers has children under three. Two out of five have children
of school age. Among the remainder, about 50 percent have
husbands who earn less than $5,000 a year-many of them
much less. I believe they bear the heaviest burden of any group
in our nation. Where the mother is the sole support of the
family, she often must face the hard choice of either accepting
29. Cf. 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964).
30. The opposition to equality for women in employment is so great that this per-
cenitage continues to decrease. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
31. This figure had risen to 29.5 million women in August, 1968, constituting al-
most 38 percent of the nation's labor force. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ-
ment and Earnings, Aug., 1968.
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public assistance or taking a position at a pay rate which
averages less than two-thirds of the pay rate for men. 2
The same points were made by Secretary of Labor, Willard W. Wirtz,88
and by a number of members of the Senate and the House in the con-
gressional debates.3"
While women's groups were pressing Congress for the Equal Pay
Act, women advocates of equality in employment under the banner of
the National Woman's Party 5 were entreating Congress to add protec-
tion for women to the fair employment practices bills which were the
predecessors of Title VII. On December 16, 1963, when H.R. 7152,8"
the bill which was enacted as the Civil Rights Act, was pending before
Congress, the National Council of the National Woman's Party adopted
the following resolution which was presented to every member of
Congress:
Whereas the Civil Rights Bill [H.R. 7152] deals with the
denial of Civil Rights on the ground of "Race, Color, Religion,
or National Origin," and on no other grounds,-and does not
concern itself in any way with the denial of Civil Rights to the
countless women who are suffering from unemployment, from
unequal pay, from unequal job opportunities, from unequal
educational opportunities, and from many other handicaps and
discriminations-solely on the ground of their sex;
Be it Resolved, that the Congress of the United States be
asked to amend the Civil Rights Bill [H.R. 7152] so as to
make it serve the interests and welfare of all American citizens
without distinction as to sex.3"
The members of the National Woman's Party strongly believed that
not only were women entitled to protection from discrimination in
wage rates between them and men performing equal work in the same
establishment but also that they needed further protection from the
32. Remarks by the President upon Signing the Equal Pay Act, 21 CONG. Q. 978
(1963).
33. 109 CONG. REC. 2888-89 (1963).
34. Id. at 2286 (1963) (Senator McNamara) ; id. at 8916 (Senator Hart) ; id. at
9199 (Representative Green); id. at 9202 (Representative Kelly) ; id. 9211-12 (Repre-
sentative Ryan) ; id. at 9199-200 (Representative Dwyer) and id. at 9212 (Representa-
tive Donahue). See also id. at 8914.
35. The author has been a member of the National Council of the National Wo-
man's Party since 1960.
36. 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
37. National Woman's Party, Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964.
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broader discriminations practiced against them in hiring, job assign-
ments and promotions. Under the leadership of Miss Alice Paul, 8
founder and honorary chairman, and the late Mrs. Emma Guffey Miller,
former president, the National Woman's Party launched a strenuous
effort to educate Congress concerning the need for including women in
Title VII. The Party furnished the members of Congress with sociological
information and statistics from government publications which showed
conclusively that 1) sex discrimination against both white and non-white
women in employment was comparable to race discrimination,"9 2)
women in positions that required education and training were paid less
for their services than men performing routine jobs requiring lesser
skills"0 and 3) the median wage for men in some occupations was over
twice that for women in the same occupations since women were assigned
to dead-end jobs and were not considered for promotions."
As a result of the campaign to convince Congress of its need, the
amendment adding discrimination on the basis of sex to the other dis-
criminations prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was in-
troduced, debated and adopted in the House of Representatives, by a vote
of 168 to 133 on February 8, 1964."5 Protection against discrimination
in employment based on sex was retained in the Senate version of the
bill which passed both legislative bodies and was approved by the
President on July 1, 1964.'"
In the debates in the House of Representatives, the amendment
adding protection against sex discrimination in employment received
strong support from the women in Congress who undoubtedly were
most influential in achieving its passage.' Representative Martha Grif-
fiths pointed out that it had long been known that "white women and
Negroes occupied relatively the same position in American society."' 5
She also made the important point that the sex discrimination in Title
VII would supersede discriminatory state restrictive laws which have
long been used as an excuse for discrimination against women by both
employers and labor unions. 6
38. Miss Alice Paui and the organizers of the National Woman's Party led the
campaign for women's suffrage which culminated in the passage of the nineteenth amend-
ment. The National Woman's Party has also led the still unwon struggle for passage
of the Equal Rights Amendment.
39. National Woman's Party Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964).
43. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2355.
44. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
45. Id. at 2578.
46. Id. at 2580.
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Representative Katharine St. George, another one of the amend-
ment's chief supporters, pointed out that women want equality, not the
phony so-called "protection" of discriminatory state laws:
Protective legislation prevents, as my colleague from the
State of Michigan just pointed out-prevents women from
going into the higher salary brackets. Yes, it certainly does.
Women are protected-they cannot run an elevator late
at night and that is when the pay is higher.
They cannot serve in restaurants and cabarets late at night
-when the tips are higher-and the load, if you please, is
lighter.
So it is not exactly helping them--oh, no, you have taken
beautiful care of women.
But what about the offices, gentlemen, that are cleaned
every morning about 2 or 3 o'clock in the city of New York
and the offices that are cleaned quite early here in Washington,
D. C.? Does anybody worry about those women? I have never
heard of anybody worrying about the women who do that work.
So you see the thing is completely unfair .... We do not
want special privileges. We do not need special privilege .... I
believe we can hold our own. We are entitled to this little
crumb of equality."'
Representative Catherine May pointed out that for years women
had attempted to get legislative action to prevent sex discrimination and
that it was urgent for the amendment prohibiting sex discrimination
in employment to be passed.
We have been trying since 1923 to get enacted in the Con-
gress an equal rights for women amendment to the Constitu-
tion.
Since 1923 more and more Members have offered this
amendment, but we have never gotten the bill out of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. The League of Women Voters, some
Federated Women's Clubs, the National Federation of Business
and Professional Women have joined the National Woman's
Party in consistently asking that whenever laws or Executive
orders exist which forbid discrimination on account of race,
color, religion, or national origin that these same laws and
orders should also forbid discrimination on account of sex.
47. Id. at 2580-81.
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Recently in our congressional mail we received a letter
from Emma Guffey Miller, national chairman of the National
Woman's Party, which expresses alarm over the complete
absence in this bill of any reference to civil rights for women....
I share the views of my collegue from Oregon [Mrs.
Green] in her desire to eliminate the proven discriminations
which colored women have suffered, but at the same time I
feel that it is only just and fair to give all women protection
against discrimination.
Mr. Chairman, this is to me the crux of the question
before us. As I say, I am supporting the amendment on that
basis and on behalf of the various women's organizations
in this country that have for many years been asking for
action from the Congress in this field, and who see this as the
one possibility we may have of getting effective action."8
A number of the men in the House of Representatives made
short statements urging passage of the sex discrimination pro-
vision." However, the thought of equality for women in employment
caused one male member, who was vehemently against it, to hysterically
exclaim, "What would become of the crimes of rape and statutory
rape? Would the Mann Act be invalidated ?"5 Fortunately the eloquent
pleas for equality made by the women members of the House finally
prevailed. The sex discrimination provision of Title VII became law,
and the nation became committed to a policy of condemning discrimina-
tions against women in employment.51
In spite of the obvious humanitarian intent of the sex discrimina-
tion provision in Title VII and the urgent need for it, some adversaries
of equality were enraged by its passage. They attempted to discredit the
women's movement by disseminating the rumor that the purpose of the
sex discrimination provision was to sabotage the Civil Rights Act and
to damage the cause of racial minorities. There was no logical basis
for the charge since the sex discrimination provision protects black
women as well as white women. Black women who suffer the double
discrimination based on their sex and race especially needed this addi-
48. Id. at 2582.
49. See id. at 2583-84.
50. Id. at 2577 (remarks of Representative Celler).
51. The thinly veiled strategy was to discredit the sex discrimination provision ano
hinder its enforcement by creating the false impression that persons who favor equality
for women are advocates of racial discrimination. The sex discrimination provision was
greatly needed by black women who suffer double discrimination based on sex and race.
The accusation of opponents of equality for women was thus totally false.
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tional protection. The antifeminists based their charge against the pro-
ponents of the sex discrimination provision on the ground that it had
been introduced in the House by Representative Howard Smith who was
opposed to civil rights legislation." The charge, in effect, was that Mr.
Smith, with political motivation, almost single-handedly achieved passage
of the sex discrimination provision. As palpably untrue as this accusa-
tion was, a number of law review articles purported to give credence to
it. 53
Representative Smith repudiated the accusation against him with
the following explanation:
The statement that the amendment was "slipped in" the
bill by me in an attempt to delay voting is utterly untrue, as
the record shows.
The amendment was a popular one. Particularly active
in its adoption were the women Members of the House. It
was debated fully and adopted in the House in open debate,
and subsequently approved in the Senate."
The record of proceedings before the Committee on Rules of the House
of Representatives held during the week of January 9 through 16,
1964, shows that Representative Smith did not "slip the bill in." His
intention to introduce the bill was announced weeks before its introduc-
tion when the following colloquy transpired between him, as Chairman
of the Committee, and Representative Celler, the floor manager of the
bill:
The Chairman. I have just had a letter this morning which
I was going to bring to your attention later, from the National
Woman's Party. They want to know why you did not include
sex in the bill. Why did you not?
Mr. Celler. This is a civil rights bill.
The Chairman. Don't women have civil rights?
Mr. Celler. They have lots of them They are supermen."
52. Representative Smith voted against the entire Civil Rights Act. Id. at 2804.
53. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 79 (1964) ; Kanowitz, Sex Based Discrimination in American
Law, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 306, 311 (1968) ; Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 879 (1967) ; Note, Classification on
the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778, 779 (1965).
54. Letter from Representative Howard Smith to Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Jan.
4, 1966, cited in Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877, 883 n.34 (1967).
55. Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
125 (1964).
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Representative Smith later told Representative Celler, "I think I will
offer an amendment. The National Woman's Party were serious about
it." 6 The National Woman's Party's plea that protection against sex
discrimination should be added to the bill had not been directed to
Representative Smith alone but to all the members of Congress. In
fact, Representative Bolton stated in the debates that she too had intended
to introduce a sex discrimination amendment." Obviously, the accusation
of misogynists that the passage of the sex discrimination provision was
Representative Smith's joke contrived to hurt racial minorities is utterly
untrue. It was an insult both to the United States Congress and to
feminists who had the courage to fight for this much needed legislation.
It is clear from the legislative history of the amendment adding
sex to the other prohibited forms of discrimination that Congress re-
cognized that women, as a class, were subjected to invidious employ-
ment discriminations comparable to those inflicted upon Negroes. There
was also a clear intent as shown in the House debate, that federal law
should supersede state restrictive laws which have been used as alibis
for sex discrimination." The federal courts in Title VII cases have
properly recognized that sex discrimination and race discrimination in
employment are equally serious and that women are entitled to the
statute's protections against discrimination in the same manner as are
blacks. For example, the Third Circuit in Rosen v. Public Service
Electric & Gas Co.59 stated: "We do not make the distinction . . . that
discrimination on account of sex is any less reprehensible or any less
protected than discrimination because of race." Similarly, in Local i86,
International Pulp, Sulfite & Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining
& Manufacturing Co.,60 the court declared that it
does not and will not draw any legal distinctions between the
seriousness and gravamen of acts and policies of sexual dis-
crimination alleged herein and the more frequently litigated
acts of racial discrimination. [61]
. .. [T]his court cannot conclude that under the allega-
tions herein presented, sexual discrimination differs in any
significant way from racial discrimination as a form of class dis-
crimination. 2
56. Id.
57. 110 CONG. REc. 2578 (1964).
58. Id. at 2580.
59. 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969).
60. 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
61. Id. at 1287.
62. Id. at 1289.
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It would appear, therefore, that the precedents established in race dis-
crimination cases are equally applicable to cases of sex discrimination
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT
Scope of the Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act applies to every employer having employees
subject to a minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act."8 It
prohibits such employers from discriminating on the basis of sex between
employees working in the same establishment by paying wages to the
employees of one sex at a lesser rate than employees of the other when
such employees are engaged in "equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility" and such work is
"performed under similar working conditions." ' It prohibits an employer
from reducing the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with the
provisions of the Act. 5 Finally, it prohibits labor organizations from
causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of the equal pay provisions.88
Only in a limited fact situation does the Equal Pay Act offer a
remedy. The discriminations against women resulting from sex discrim-
ination in hiring, promotion and job assignment and the exclusion of
women from certain occupations, while not within the coverage of the
Equal Pay Act, may in many instances be within the coverage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. 7 However, sex discrimination in employ-
ment is so deeply engrained that the courts have handled many equal pay
cases dealing with employees in a variety of occupations: selector packers
of a glass company;"8 bank tellers ;"8 machine operators of a cup manu-
facturing firm ;70 laboratory analysts of a mining and refining company;,
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1964).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 206(d) (2) (1964).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
68. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970).
69. Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969), dismissed
sub nom. Wirtz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank 63 CCH Lab. Cas. f 32,378 (S.D. Tex.
1970); Shultz v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 300 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
70. Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970), relief
granted sub noma. Hodgson v. American Can Co., 314 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. Ark. 1970),
af fd on rehearing, 317 F. Supp. 153 (W.D. Ark. 1970). rev'd in part, 19 Wage & Hour
Cas. 1000 (8th Cir. 1971).
71. Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966).
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bun packers of a bakery 72 laboratory technicians of a brewing com-
pany;" inspectors of a glass manufacturing company;74 extrusion press
operators of a ceramics company;"' punch press operators, paint line
tenders, sub-assemblers, final assemblers, inspectors or checkers and
packers of a toy gun manufacturer;"' and machine operators and assem-
blers of an electrical equipment firm." In many instances the suit is
brought by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of women employees.
Equal Work
The plaintiff in an equal pay case has the burden of proving that
he or she has performed work equal to that performed by employees of
the other sex involving equal skill, effort and responsibility." The plain-
tiff necessarily has to produce evidence which permits an accurate com-
parison of plaintiff's duties and those of employees of the other sex.
The courts have set forth some criteria for determining whether
work is "equal" within the meaning of the Act. In Shultz v. American
Can Co. -Dixie Products"8 and Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,"0 the
courts emphasized that in equal pay cases "equal" does not mean
"identical." As the Third Circuit aptly stated the principle in Wheaton
Glass,
Congress in prescribing "equal" work did not require that
the jobs be identical, but only that they must be substantially
equal. Any other interpretation would destroy the remedial
purpose of the Act.
The Act was intended as a broad charter of women's
rights in the economic field. It sought to overcome the age-old
belief in women's inferiority and to eliminate the depressing
effects on living standards of reduced wages for female workers
and the economic and social consequences which flow from it."'
Since "equal" means "substantially equal," employers cannot avoid the
consequence of the Act by gerrymandering a few duties from its women
72. Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
73. Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co., 307 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
74. Shultz v. Corning Glass Works, 319 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
75. Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
76. Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
77. Hodgson v. Square D Co., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 753 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
78. See Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1967), a case in
which the court concluded that the plaintiff's burden was not met.
79. 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970).
80. 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
19711
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1971], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss2/5
340 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
employees to its male employees. This principle has been followed in a
number of other court decisions.82
In deciding that the men and women selector packers in Wheaton
Glass performed equal work, the Third Circuit refused to accept the
defendant's defense that the work of the men and women was unequal
because of extra duties performed by the men. The defendant company
had claimed that a differential of 21I20 per hour between the women
selector packers and the men selector packers was justified because some
of the men, as an insubstantial part of their duties, performed the work of
lower paid male employees designated as "snap-up boys." The snap-up
boys, the lowest paid males, were paid 20 an hour more than the women
selector packers but 19Y20 less per hour than the men selector packers.
Commenting on the "incongruity" of the company's claim that the
men selector packers were more "flexible" and more valuable to their
employer because of the occasional performance of the work of the snap-
up boys, the court determined that
[t]he motive . . . clearly appears to have been to keep women
in a subordinate role rather than to confer flexibility on the
company and to emphasize this subordination by both the 10%
differential between male and female selector-packers and the
two cents difference between snap-up boys and female selector-
packers.8"
A somewhat similar situation was presented in Shultz v. American
Can Co.-Dixie Products,84 a case involving machine operators manu-
facturing paper cups. It was claimed by the company that the differential
pay between men and women operators was because of the extra duties
of handling and loading paper performed by the men. The court rejected
this argument, pointing out that the paper handling duties were performed
on a regular basis by unskilled workers who were paid seventeen cents
per hour less than the women machine operators.85 The courts have
quite properly considered invalid the specious defenses of employers
based on the theory that the occasional performance by men employees
of duties involving lesser skills than those primarily performed by them
82. Hodgson v. Square D Co., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 753 (E.D. Ky. 1970) ; Hodg-
son v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Shultz v. Saxonburg
Ceramics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Shultz v. First Nat'l Bank, 19
Wage & Hour Cas. 300 (E.D. Tex. 1969) ; Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp.
1049 (E.D. Ky. 1967) ; Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966).
83. 421 F.2d at 264.
84. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
85. Id. at 361.
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and their women counterparts will justify a pay differential in favor of
such men employees.8"
The courts have also held in equal pay cases that a violation occurs
when a pay differential exists between men and women performng
equal work, and the violation continues even though the members of the
sex receiving the higher rates may be transferred to other jobs. To
illustrate, Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics, Inc." determined that women
employees are entitled to receive the "male" rate of pay when they replace
men to perform work previously performed by men. Similarly, in Wirtz
v. Koller Craft Plastic Products, Inc.,8 Wirtz v. Versail Manufacturing,
Inc.,8 and Wirtz v. Midwest Manufacturing Corp.9" the transfer of men
employees who had been receiving higher rates of pay than their women
counterparts was considered by the courts to be no excuse for continuing
to pay the women employees at the lower rate of pay. Furthermore, in
Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co.9 the court held that after women
employees replacing men became entitled to the higher rate, newly hired
men performing equal work with such women were likewise entitled
to the higher rate, since any other conclusion would permit the reduction
of wage rates contrary to the provisions of the Act.
Equal Skill, Effort and Responsibility
In equal pay cases the plaintiff must prove that he or she performs
work which involves skill, effort and responsibility equal to that per-
formed by counterparts of the other sex who receive a higher rate of pay.
The defense most frequently made is that the work performed by men
and women employees does not involve equal effort. Often it is claimed
that minor weight lifting duties assigned to and performed by men
employees while their women counterparts continue their often more
difficult and exacting regular duties are the basis for differentials in
favor of the men employees. The weight lifting, however, is frequently
accomplished by machinery and does not require as much effort as the
regular job. In many instances these alleged extra duties simply afford
the men employees a break in the tedium of their regular assigned duties
which often involve repetitive performance of exacting or detailed work-
a break which their women counterparts do not get since they are
required to stay at their posts of duty. In many instances where it is
86. See notes 92-117 infra and accompanying text.
87. 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
88. 296 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
89. 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 527 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
90. 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 556 (S.D. Ill. 1968).
91. 307 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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claimed that the men employees perform weight lifting duties not
assigned to women, such duties are performed by some, but not all, of
the men even though all of the men employees are paid the higher rate of
pay. In such cases the courts have found no difficulty in holding that
minor differences in weight lifting responsibilities were not a permissible
defense to equal pay violations. 2
In Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Products9 3 a case in which
the court concluded that the work of men and women employees was
equal, the Eighth Circuit dealt with the type of defenses typically raised
in equal pay cases. The defendant claimed that the difference between
male and female rates of pay was made because of the extra duties of
handling and loading supplies performed by the male employees. The
court rejected this claim on the ground that even if the extra weight
lifting duties were "regularly" performed by the men employees, such
duties did not render their work and that of their women counterparts
unequal under equal pay standards. The court found that such weight
lifting duties were "minor and incidental" and "most of the physical and
mental effort extended in the performance of the job," as a whole, related
to the primary duties which both men and women employees performed in
common.
9 4
A recent district court decision, Hodgson v. Daisy Manufacturing
Co.,"9 is in accord with American Can in its evaluation of what con-
stitutes "equal effort." Summing up the fact situation and its conclusion
that the jobs of men and women packers were equal within the meaning
of the Act, the court stated that
[i]t is also clear that the males exert greater physical effort
than the females when lifting and turning master cartons
weighing 65 pounds, which constitute a majority of the master
cartons involved. The females, however, in performing a variety
of operations requiring comparatively greater mental alertness
and concentration, exert greater mental effort and their jobs
require greater job responsibility. The court simply cannot say
that the greater physical effort expended by the males in a
92. See Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prod., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970);
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Shultz v. Saxonburg Cer-
amics, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F.
Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Hodgson v. Square D Co., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 753
(E.D. Ky. 1970) ; Shultz v. Hayes Indus., Inc., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 447 (N.D. Ohio
1970) ; Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
93. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
94. Id. at 360.
95. 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
342
Berger: Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
basic and uncomplicated operation results in a substantial over-
all job inequality justifying a significant wage differential."8
Thus, in determining whether male and female jobs involve equal
effort, effort does not mean the exercise of sheer brawn alone. It includes
mental effort and the alertness and concentration that the job basically
requires.
Another defense raised by the defendant in American Can was that
the pay differential between men and women was justifiable because
the men employees worked the night shift and were required to perform
extra duties such as handling and loading rolls of paper. In rejecting
this argument the court pointed out that the differential paid the male
employees was in addition to a "shift premium" paid to all employees
on the second and night shifts. 7 The differential over and above the
amount of the regular shift premium, therefore, could not be attributed
to the fact that the men employees worked on the night shift. Further-
more, the court noted that the men night shift operators received the
higher male rate even though some of them were not required to perform
the alleged extra duties for any significant period. 8 The court noted
that the men operators received the higher rate of pay whether they
spent "a few minutes or thirty-three minutes per shift in the handling and
loading function, whether the rolls of paper weigh fifty or fifteen hundred
pounds, whether the rolls are loaded manually or mechanically . . or
whether they perform the job alone or with . . . assistance" of other night
shift employees. 9 Since the alleged extra night shift duties were not
considered significant enought to justify a pay differential between
the men who performed them and the men who did not, it was the court's
conclusion that these extra duties were not significant enough to justify
a differential between the men operators who performed them and the
women operators who did not.1"'
The claim that the male employees were required to exert extra
effort was also raised in Hodgson v. Square D Co.' This claim was
based on the fact that the men machine operators and assemblers worked
on larger parts than their female counterparts. The court pointed out
that there was no evidence that the size of the part made the duties of
the employee more difficult."0 2 A comparison of the work performed by
96. Id. at 551.
97. 424 F.2d at 361.
98. Id. at 360.
99. Id. at 361.
100. Id.
101. 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 753 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
102. Id. at 754.
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men and women based on actual job content showed that the effort
involved was substantially equal. Therefore, the court concluded that
"[t]he mere fact that jobs of the assembly workers and machine
operators may be divided into arbitrary categories does not mean they
require unequal degrees of skill, work effort and responsibility.""1 '
The fact that employees of one sex may on occasions and at identi-
fiable times be assigned extra duties which would justify a differential
between them and employees of the other sex does not justify paying a
higher wage rate to the employees performing the extra duties since
their entire job cycle includes the periods in which they perform equal
work with their counterparts of the other sex.' To illustrate, in Wirtz
v. Basic, Inc., 0' a male laboratory analyst was employed in a position in
which he normally performed equal work with women laboratory an-
alysts. Every alternate two-week period he worked a swing shift for
which an additional 50 per hour was paid. His employer, however, paid
him a higher rate per hour than his women counterparts for all hours
worked. In concluding that this was a violation of the Equal Pay Act,
the court said:
There could be no effective enforcement of the equal pay pro-
visions if differentials between sexes were permitted for all
hours worked because of the substantially different working
conditions and responsibilities entailed in a specific part of the
work performed at identifiable times and places. As "Shifts
Analyst," [the male employee] is entitled to a different rate
of pay while he is working as a shift analyst, but not while
working on the day shift.0
The Equal Pay Act, of course, had no retroactive effects. However,
the courts have held that it is relevant in equal pay cases for the plaintiff
to introduce evidence of the historical background of an employer's
policy of making a sex differential in wage rates. In American Can,
the court pointed out that a differential between the wage rates of men
and women existing before the effective date of the Equal Pay Act
was indication of equal pay violations when such differential continued
to exist after the Act became operative." 7 Similar conclusions were
103. Id.
104. Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Wirtz v.
Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966).
105. 256 F. Supp. 786 (D. Nev. 1966).
106. Id. at 791.
107. 424 F.2d at 361.
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reached in the cases of Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,"°8 Shultz v. Corn-
ing Glass Works,' Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramics Co."' and Murphy v.
Miller Brewing Co."' In each of these cases, prior to the effective date of
the Equal Pay Act, the employers had dual pay schedules for men and
women employees. After the Act became effective an attempt was made
to explain the "male" and "female" jobs wage distinctions," 2 but no
significant changes were made in job content as to the women employees
and the differential in pay between men and women was not eliminated.
The courts regarded evidence of practices of discrimination that were
traditional and historical as relevant in determining whether equal pay
violations existed. Seemingly neutral practices which preserve and ef-
fectively continue past sex discrimination are violative of the Equal Pay
Act.
The courts have also held in equal pay cases that a violation occurs
when a pay differential exists between men and women performing equal
work even though they may not be employed simultaneously. In a
number of cases it has been held that women employees are entitled to
receive the "male" rate of pay when they replace men and function in the
position previously held by the men and that the reassignment or transfer
of the men employees did not affect the right of the women to be raised
to a higher rate." 3 Consistent with the theory that after an equal pay
violation has occurred the higher rate paid to the favored sex becomes
the only legal rate, the courts declared in Shultz v. American Can Co.
-Dixie Products,"' Shultz v. Corning Glass Works,"' and Hodgson v.
Square D Co." 6 that the opening up of job classifications previously
considered as "male" to women at the higher rate or the placing of men
in classifications previously regarded as "female" at the lower rate did
108. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
109. 319 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
110. 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
111. 307 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
112. Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), is an ex-
ample of how employers have sometimes changed their nomenclature without changing
their system of wage differentials. In that case the employer had previously used "male"
and "female" designations to describe the work of men and women employees. After
equal pay violations were charged the employer changed the terminology. "Male" was
changed to "heavy," "female" was changed to "light." The court held that the jobs of
men and women were "equal" under equal pay standards and considered the terminology
irrelevant.
113. Shultz v. Saxonburg Ceramic, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ; Wirtz
v. Koller Craft Plastic Prod., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mo. 1968) ; Wirtz v.
Vermail Mfg. Co., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 527 (N.D. Ind. 1968); Wirtz v. Midwest Mfg.
Co., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 556 (S.D. 11. 1968).
114. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
115. 319 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
116. 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 753 (E.D. Ky. 1970).
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not cure the violations or relieve the employer from the obligation to con-
tinue to pay the higher rate to the lower paid employees in the classifica-
tion in which the violation occurred. 117
Viewed from a logical standpoint, the courts have reached the
correct conclusions. The transfer of men employees to different positions
does not eliminate the discrimination which is being committed against
the women employees. If the Act were construed to permit the lowering
of women's wages because the men with whom they previously per-
formed equal work had been transferred to other positions, its remedial
purposes could easily be defeated by any employer who exercised a little
ingenuity in reassigning his men employees and reducing the wage rates
of his women employees. The cases holding that the wage rates of
women employees may not be reduced after transfer of their male counter-
parts are consistent with the rules of statutory construction which prohibit
giving a statute an interpretation which would tend to nullify it and defeat
its intent. 18
Potential Affirmative Defenses to Equal Pay Suits
The Equal Pay Act contains a clause stating that an employer
will not be considered to have violated the Equal Pay Act if the pay
differential between men and women employees is "pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii)a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any factor other than sex . . ."" The last clause, number (iv), is re-
dundant because it adds nothing to the sense of the statute. Since the
Equal Pay Act merely prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex," ob-
viously it does not prohibit discrimination "on any other factor other than
sex." The other factors mentioned, i.e., a seniority system, a merit system
and a system which measures earnings on the basis of quantity and quality
of production, are sometimes broadly referred to as "exceptions" al-
though actually they are merely potential affiirmative defenses which a
defendant in all cases has the burden of proving.
The enumeration of these potential affirmative defenses in the statute
should not be interpreted to mean that an employer may "discriminate
117. Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co., 307 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Wis. 1969) ; Koller
Craft Plastic Prod., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mo. 1968) ; Wirtz v. Versail Mfg. Co.,
18 Wage & Hour Cas. 527 (N.D. Ind. 1968); Wirtz v. Midwest Mfg. Co., 18 Wage &
Hour Cas. 556 (S.D. Il. 1968).
118. Statutes are never given "absurd and futile" interpretations. The courts in-
terpret remedial acts so as to achieve their basic policy and purposes. See Roland Elec.
Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946) ; United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.,
310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
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...on the basis of sex" if he merely proves the existence of "a seniority
system, a merit system or a system which measures earnings by quantity
and quality of production." This could be the case only if the enumerated
factors were "exceptions" from the statute's prohibitions. They are not
"exceptions" since they are designed only to clarify, not to describe,
situations in which discrimination is allowed. These factors were enu-
merated in the statute simply to make it clear that a defendant may
prove as a defense that the differential in wages was not in fact based on
sex but was based on a non-discriminatory seniority system, a non-
discriminatory merit system or a non-discriminatory system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production. A sex-based
system or a system in which sex plays any part cannot be considered as
a proper defense under the Equal Pay Act. Otherwise, employers could
escape the impact of the act by establishing a "seniority system" pro-
viding different seniority lines for men and women, a "merit system"
that applied differently to men and women, or a system measuring earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production which set different standards
for men and women.
Unlike section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act,' the Equal Pay
Act does not say that these systems must be "bona fide" or that they
must not be the result "of an intention to discriminate . . . ." However,
it is implicit in the Act, especially with its express intent to eliminate
sex discrimination, that the seniority system, merit system or system
rewarding quantity and quality of production must be bona fide and not a
device for evading the Act. Any other conclusion would violate the
cardinal rules of statutory construction-that a remedial statute must be
liberally construed 2' and given a meaning which effectuates its pur-
poses. 2 Accordingly, whether a defendant pleads one of the three systems
mentioned as a defense or whether he claims the differential is based on
some "factor other than sex," his defense will fail if sex is any part
of the basis for the differential between men and women.
In line with these principles, the Fifth Circuit in Shultz v. First
Victoria National Bank 2 rejected the defendant's claim that the pay
differential between men and women tellers was based on a trainee
program rather than sex because the evidence showed that the trainee
program was itself discriminatory against women."' Women had been
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
121. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
123. 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
124. Id. at 655-56.
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arbitrarily excluded from being "trainees." Furthermore, the manner in
which the bank dealt with the male "trainees" indicated that there was
no bona fide trainee program. The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that
it is apparent that the training programs that the District Court
found to exist and be the motivation for the discrimination
were not specific and their metes and bounds were at best poorly
surveyed. As structured and operated it was little more than a
post-event justification for disparate pay to men and women
from the commencement of employment up through advance-
ment." 5
Similarly the Eighth Circuit in Shultz v. American Can Co.-
Dixie Products"6 concluded that the differential in pay between men and
women machine operators could not be explained on the ground that the
men were participating in a "training program" for maintenance work.'"
The court reasoned:
The Company has no bona fide 'training program,' . . . to train
night shift operators, whether male or female for maintenance
responsibility. All operators have an equal opportunity to
gain an understanding of maintenance problems by operating
their machines. Furthermore, men hired as operators are not
required to demonstrate greater mechanical ability than women
hired for the same positions. 28
Allegations by employers that women are absent more than men or
that it costs more to employ women than to employ men cannot be a
proper basis for defense under the Equal Pay Act. Making generaliza-
tions that members of one sex are inferior and using such an assumption
as a justification for treating the individual members of such sex
differently is sex discrimination." 9 This issue arose in Wirtz v. Midwest
Manufacturing Corp.,' in which the company tried to defend on the
ground that it cost more to employ women than it did to employ men.
The court repudiated this agrument holding that a "wage differential
125. Id. at 655.
126. 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970).
127. Id. at 362.
128. Id.
129. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61-62 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964) ; Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d
156, 163 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 969 (1958), wherein the courts held that
black children could not be deprived of their right to attend integrated schools on the
assumed ground that as a group they are academically inferior to white children.
130. 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 556 (S.D. Ill. 1968).
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based on such claimed differences does not qualify as a differential
based on any 'other factor other than sex.' "131
Of course the defendant would always have the burden of proving
that a wage differential shown to exist between his men and women
employees was not based on sex but on a bona fide seniority system,
merit system, system that establishes wages on the basis of quantity or
quality of production or some other ground in which sex played no part.
The facts which would tend to establish such defenses would ordinarily
be known only to the defendant. "Plaintiff is not required to establish
a negative factor especially when that factor is within the peculiar know-
ledge of defendant."'3 2
If the defendant fails to plead such a defense in his answer or by
timely motion, he is regarded as having waived the right to make such
defense under rule 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
He therefore is not entitled to raise a defense on appeal or on remand
that has been waived. Economically powerful employers and their
attorneys are sometimes adroit about conceiving other defenses when
their first defense fails and thereby exhausting impecunious plaintiffs
and their counsel with interminable litigation. Accordingly, rule 12(h)
is a good rule for plaintiffs' attorneys to remember in cases under either
the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.
Enforcement Provisions of the Equal Pay Act
While the remedy afforded for sex discrimination by the Equal Pay
Act applies to a narrower area than that protected by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, litigants under the Equal Pay Act have the advantage
of the strong enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.' 4 In case of equal pay violations, the employee or employees
affected may sue for the amount of unpaid wages, an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages and a reasonable attorney's fee under
section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act."5 Under section 16(c)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, on written request by an employee,
the Secretary of Labor is authorized to bring suit for back wages on the
employee's behalf if the case involves an issue of law which has been
131. Id. at 561.
132. United States v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 191 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1903).
133. Rule 12(h) allows "an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim"
to be made in pleading motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the,
merits. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (2).
134. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1964).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
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finally settled by the courts." 6 The Secretary may also bring suit under
section 17 for an injunction against the offending employer, coupled with
a request for an order restraining withholding of back wages due
employees as a result of equal pay violations." 7
The Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act offer
overlapping remedies in some instances. However, it is to the advantage
of a litigant who has suffered discriminations prohibited by the Equal
Pay Act to take advantage of that Act's stronger enforcement provisions.
Sex discrimination in employment between men and women employees
performing "equal work" is widely prevalent. 8 The Equal Pay Act has
the potential to significantly improve the employment situation of women.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEX DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION
OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT"3 9
Scope of the Sex Discrimination of Title VII
The sex discrimination provision of Title VI1 gives much broader
protection than the Equal Pay Act. It protects women from discrimina-
tion in hiring, job assignment and promotions as well as discrimina-
tion between men and women performing substantially equal work. If
the sex discrimination provision of Title VII had not been passed,
employers committed to policies of sex discrimination with the collabora-
tion of male dominated labor unions could have simply gerrymandered
enough duties to make the jobs of men and women unequal for purposes
of the Equal Pay Act and continued their traditional practices of sex
discrimination with impunity. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits
such tactics. However, women and their attorneys must insist on its
most rigid enforcement if women are ever to be raised to positions of
first class citizenship.
In achieving relief from discriminations in employment by court
actions under Title VII, women have made some important progress.
The Seventh Circuit's landmark decision of Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co. "" established the principle that Title VII will not permit the exclusion
of women as a class from legitimate occupations and job assignments.
In that case women employees in an Indiana plant with 600 potential
jobs were confined by their employer to less than one hundred of the
lowest paid jobs. The assumption had been made by the defendant com-
136. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1964).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
138. See Murray, supra note 22.
139. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964).
140. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
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pany that women as a class lacked the "ability" to perform all of the better
jobs. The company also claimed that women were excluded from the
higher paid jobs to "protect" them since the jobs required lifting of
over 35 pounds. 4 ' The women employees who instituted this class action
under Title VII considered the company's policies particularly unfair
since some women workers were required to lift 17 tons of soap products
a day while men operated automatic machines or handled empty plastic
bottles for a higher rate of pay. The women plaintiffs lost their case in
the district court 4 2 and appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, char-
acterizing the sex discrimination in the defendant's plant as "blatant."'4 8
It held that stereotyped assumptions that women as a class were not
qualified for certain positions because they lack the strength to efficiently
perform the duties required do not constitute a permissible basis for
defense under Title VII.'" The court laid down the important principle
that "individual qualifications and conditions" must be the criterion in
making job placements and assignments of men and women employees.' 45
The rule that women like men must be dealt with in employment on
the basis of individual ability and aptitude is the only permissible judicial
interpretation of Title VII in view of the constitutional implications in
cases involving employment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the right to work for a living is a liberty and property protected by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment'4" and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.' 7 While the
Supreme Court has held that individuals were protected under these
constitutional provisions from government-imposed discriminations in
employment because of their race, it has consistently dodged the op-
portunity of holding that women are entitled to similar protection from
government discrimination because of their sex.' However, the four-
teenth and fifth amendments expressly and specifically apply to all
"persons," and the constitutional language itself will not permit a court
to conclude that any person may be denied protection of the fourteenth
141. This was the basis of the lower court's decision for the defendant. 272 F.
Supp. 332, 353-66 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
142. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
143. 416 F.2d at 719.
144. Id. at 718.
145. Id.
146. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
147. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944).
148. See Eastwood, supra note 28, at 286-88.
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and fifth amendments because of such "person's" normal human traits
irrevocably determined at birth, e.g., race, skin color or sex.4' Con-
sequently, women "persons" are entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tection against employment discrimination perpetrated by governmental
action that has been afforded to racial groups.5 °
The Supreme Court has also ruled that when a court places tht
stamp of government approval on private discriminations so as to deprive
persons of constitutional rights, the action of the court is governmental
action prohibited by the fourteenth or fifth amendment.' Under the
circumstances, the only constitutional interpretation that can be given
Title VII by a government agency or a state or federal court is that it
prohibits applicable employers. 5 from making any classification whatso-
ever on the basis of sex which would exclude an otherwise qualified
woman from engaging in any employment of her choice.
The BFOQ Provision
Because a woman's right to work for a living in an occupation of
her choice cannot be taken away by governmental action, judicial or
legislative, the courts are required to give the so-called "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification [BFOQ] provision" of Title VII a very limited
interpretation. The provision states that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise . .. ."'
149. The fourteenth amendment provides that "No State shall . . . deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis supplied.) The fifth
amendment states "nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....... " (Emphasis supplied.) Constitutional provisions
must be interpreted as they read, and there is no excuse for interpolation, addition or
limitation. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957) ; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716, 731 (1931). It is constitutionally impermissible for a court to hold that the word
"persons" means only "male persons." Such a distortion would have the effect of de-
nying fundamental freedoms and basic human rights to one-half of the nation's citizens.
150. The male dominated judiciary has failed to give women the protection which
they are entitled to under the express provisions of the Constitution. See Eastwood,
supra note 28. Women litigants should be all the more vigorous in insisting on their
rights as human beings. They are not non-persons.
151. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)-(e) (1964).
153. Id. at § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
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The pertinent legislative history of the BFOQ provisions shows
that this provision was to be given very narrow construction. The
House Judiciary Committee report on the Civil Rights Act of 1964
states that the BFOQ section is "very limited" and is applicable only in
"rare situations."' 54 Pointing this out in his well-reasoned concurring
opinion in the recent case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,5 Justice
Thurgood Marshall said:
By adding the prohibition against job discrimination based on
sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act Congress intended to prevent
employers from refusing "to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.... [1.6] Even char-
acterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were
not to serve as predicates for restricting employment oppor-
tunity. The exception for "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions" was not intended to swallow the rule.
That exception has been construed by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, whose regulations are entitled
to "great deference," . . . to be applicable only to job situations
that require specific physical characteristics necessarily pos-
sessed by only one sex. Thus the exception would apply where
necessary "for the purposes of authenticity or genuiness" in
the employment of actors or actresses, fashion models, and the
like. If the exception is to be limited as Congress intended,
the Commission has given it the only possible construction.
When performance characteristics of an individual are
involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employment
opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that
are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.'57
Thus, if maleness itself is necessary to the performance of the
particular work, a woman need not be considered, but the BFOQ pro-
vision cannot be given any broader interpretation. A decision of a federal
court which purported to extend the BFOQ provision so as to deny any
otherwise qualified woman employment in a specific occupation on the
ground that women as a class may be excluded from such occupation
154. H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1963).
155. 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971), rev'g 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
156. Justice Marshall quotes from a regulation of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a) (ii) (1970). He also refers to Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
157. 91 S. Ct. at 498-99.
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would run counter to the constitutional prohibitions of the fifth amend-
ment. It would place the stamp of judicial approval on the private
discrimination of the employer so as to make it a governmental dis-
crimination, and, as a result, the woman job applicant would be denied
her right to engage in a legitimate occupation-a "liberty" and "property"
under the due process clause. 5 '
The per curiam decision of the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp."9 does not deal as directly with the BFOQ provision
as did Justice Marshall's concurring opinion,, but his opinion cannot be
construed as being inconsistent with the per curiam decision. As Justice
Marshall pointed out, this issue was "not squarely" before the Court. 0
The case was brought by Ida Lee Phillips, alleging discrimination
because of having been rejected for a job by the Martin Marietta
Corporation because of its policy of refusing to employ women with pre-
school age children. Mrs. Phillips, however, was never given an oppor-
tunity to present her case on the merits. The company filed an answer in
the district court, but it did not plead the BFOQ provision, an affir-
mative defense which it was obligated to plead under rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16' Since this was not done, the de-
fendant's right to raise the BFOQ provision as a defense had been
waived under rule 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
therefore could not have been raised on appeal to the Supreme Court.'62
Similarly, the defendant is not entitled to raise this issue on remand.'
Accordingly, the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court in Phillips
must be viewed so as to take into consideration the posture of the case
before it.
The pertinent portion of the per curiam opinion states:
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that
persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred
in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for
women and another for men---each having pre-school age
children. The existence of such conflicting obligations, if de-
monstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than
158. See notes 146-51 supra and accompanying text.
159. 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
160. Id. at 498.
161. A "party shall set forth" affirmative defenses. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
162. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
163. The case was remanded because the court of appeals erred in interpreting the
Act to permit separate hiring policies.
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for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under §
703(e) of the Act [the BFOQ provision]." 4
Since, as pointed out above, Martin Marietta had not even pleaded
the BFOQ provision in the district court and therefore waived this right,
the BFOQ issue was not properly before the Supreme Court, and the
statement regarding the effect of the BFOQ provision is pure dictum.
While the dictum lacks clarity, obviously the Court did not mean that
the BFOQ provision would permit an employer to defend in a sex
discrimination case by introducing statistics purporting to show that
women with pre-school age children are less efficient that other persons
because it emphatically said that the sex discrimination provisions of
Title VII will not permit "one hiring policy for women and another
for men-each having pre-school age children."'0 5 Since the summary
dismissal of Mrs. Phillips' case by the district court had prevented her
from providing that she was qualified as an individual for the position for
which she had applied, the Supreme Court's per curiam decision can only
be construed as meaning that on remand her case should be tried on the
merits in order that she can prove her qualifications for the job involved
and such other facts that may prove her entitlement to the relief she had
requested.
As pointed out in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 8' since Title VII
requires that employment of women must be on the basis of their
individual abilities rather than assumptions that women as a class are
inferior, the woman plaintiff simply has to show that she as an individual
was qualified to perform the job in question. If this is shown, the defense
of BFOQ is invalid.
The assumption that members of a group are inferior, and the
subjection of individuals of that group to unequal treatment on such an
assumption, is the essence of discrimination. Discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of sex is expressly what Title VII forbids. Laws for
the protection of certain groups against discrimination cannot be evaded
by allegations that the group is inferior. This principle has been well-
established in the courts. In Stell v. Savannah County Board of Educa-
tion ' 7 and Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush,'68 the Fifth Circuit
pointed out that under the fourteenth amendment a state government
could not deprive Negro children of their right to attend integrated
164. 91 S. Ct. at 497-98.
165. Id. at 498.
166. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
167. 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
168. 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
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schools on the assumption that Negro children as a group are academically
inferior to white children as a group. Similarly, under the fifth amend-
ment a federal court cannot place the stamp of approval on the policy
of a private employer that denies a qualified woman her right to work in
a job of her choice and justify such act with a court decreed edict that
women as a group are inferior.
While irrelevant to the Title VII issue, it is noteworthy to point out
the falsity of the allegation that women are inferior as employees because
of absenteeism, a belief widely proclaimed by adversaries of equality.
Government statistics show that the differences between men and women
employees in absenteeism and labor turn-over is negligible." 9 The "absen-
teeism" defense is a specious one contrived to put a respectable front on
invidious sex discrimination in employment.
Since the decision in Phillips, in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,I"' the Supreme Court has been more explicit as to its interpretation
of Title VII:
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be pre-
ferred over the better qualified simply because of minority
origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Con-
gress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality and sex become irrelevant. What
Congress has commanded is that any test used must measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."'
The Supreme Court has thus made it clear that women in employment
situations must be considered on the basis of their individual abilities
and may not be classified to their disadvantage on the basis of their sex.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.," 2 decided
prior to the Bowe case, the Fifth Circuit held that stereotyped assump-
tions of women's inferiority could not be the basis of a defense under the
BFOQ provision. In holding that the woman plaintiff could not be
denied employment as a switchman because of her sex, the court declared
that a Georgia regulation forbidding the employment of women in work
requiring the lifting of 30 pounds'73 did not have the effect of making sex
169. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN'S ABSENTEE-
ISM AND LABOR TURNOVER (1969).
170. 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
171. Id. at 856.
172. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
173. Labor Rule 59, promulgated under authority of GA. CODE ANN. § 54-122(d)
(1961).
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a bona fide occupational qualification for jobs in which such weight lift-
ing was required.
Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous,
obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the.candle. The
promise of Title VII is that women are to be on equal footing.
We cannot conclude that by including the bona fide occupational
qualification exception Congress intended to renege on that
promise."'
The Fifth Circuit set forth the following standard for determining
whether sex is a BFOQ:
[I]n order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification
exception an employer has the burden of proving that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing,
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."
The Fifth Circuit's standard would exclude a qualified woman from a job
simply because "substantially all women" were not qualified to perform
it. The Seventh Circuit's standard which is consistent with the Supreme
Court in Griggs would require that the woman job applicant be judged
on her own individual merits and capabilities.' 76 The Seventh Circuit's
approach is the only one consistent with preserving the constitutionally
protected right of an individual to earn a living as she sees fit.
Men with unusual abilities engage in extraordinary -types of employ-
ment "that substantially all men would be unable to perform." There is
no reason why a woman of unusual abilities should not engage in an
occupation that "substantially all women would be unable to perform."
The Fifth Circuit's basic decision in Weeks correctly states the principle
that Title VII protects women in their right to compete with men on the
basis of their individual abilities for "strenuous. dangerous" or "obnox-
ious" jobs. The dictum which implies that a qualified woman can be
denied employment because "substantially all women would be unable
to perform its duties safely and efficiently" should not be given pre-
cedential force.
If the woman discriminatee were required to combat testimony that
"substantially all women" could not perform the job in question, such a
174. 408 F.2d at 236.
175. Id. at 235.
176. See 408 F,2d at 235-36.
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requirement would, as a practical matter, nullify the sex discrimination
provision of Title VII. A jobless woman plaintiff who alleges that she
has been denied a right to earn a livelihood on the basis of sex would
not be in a financial position to produce expert testimony or statistics as
to what "substantially all women" can or cannot do. In any event, such
testimony or statistics are totally irrelevant in proving the plaintiff's
entitlement to employment in a position from which she has been barred
because of her sex. If any woman can perform the job involved, the
BFOQ provision is an invalid defense.
In cases in which the BFOQ defense has been pleaded, the defense
has been based on prejudice and a stereotyped idea that women are
inferior, e.g., women are weak and must be deprived of employment
involving weight lifting; women ought to be at home to take care of
their husbands and children so their hours of work should be limited;
women cannot work at night because it is unsafe; women cannot work
as bartenders because it is harmful to community morals. Quite properly
the courts have recognized that such arguments are spurious.'" Besides
the cases of Bowe and Weeks mentioned above, the courts have held the
BFOQ defense invalid in other cases involving weight lifting restric-
tions,"'78 and in cases considering statutory hours restrictions"7 9 and the
prohibition of women bartenders. 8 '
The BFOQ provision should, of course, be given the same narrow
construction regardless of whether the case involves sex discrimination
against women or against men. This was not done, however, in two
recent district court decisions involving male plaintiffs. In Dias v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.,' a man was denied a position as flight
attendant on an airline, and the court held that there was no violation
of Title VII since being a woman was a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for such position. Similarly in Schrichte v. dEastern Airlines, Inc.,"'2
the court denied summary judgment in a case in which a male plaintiff
177. See Seidenberg, The Federal Bar v. The Ale House Bar: Women in Public
Accommodations, 5 VAI. U.L. REv. 318 (1971).
178. Utility Workers, Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262
(C.D. Cal. 1970) ; Tuten v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 299 (M.D. Fla.
1969); Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D.
Ala. 1969) ; Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) ; Rosen-
feld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), remanded, 3 F.E.P. Cas.
130 (9th Cir. 1971).
179. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970) ; Rosen-
feld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), remanded, 3 F.E.P. as.
130 (9th Cir. 1971).
180. McCrimmon v. Daley, 2 F.E.P. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
181. 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
182. 2 F.E.P. Cas. 950 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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had sued under Title VII because he had been denied the position of flight
attendant because of his sex. In the latter case the court denied the motion
on the ground that the defendant airline should be afforded the oppor-
tunity of proving that being a woman was a bona fide occupational
qualification.18 Both decisions are erroneous. Obviously men as a class
are capable of being flight attendants, and the BFOQ defense is invalid
as a matter of law.
The Diaz case advanced a theory that if airline customers prefer
to have women serve them duiing flights, such customer preference is a
valid basis for the claim that being a woman is a bona fide occupational
lualification for flight attendants.184 Of course, "customer preference,"
when based on bigotry or prejudice whether in favor of or against
members of one sex, should have no place in judicial interpretations of
civil rights legislation." 5 Obviously, one reason for racial discrimination
in employment was the fact that employers often thought that their
customers preferred persons of one particular race to others. The same
attitudes of customers have influenced employment discriminations on
the basis of religion and national origin. The pettiness of customers is no
excuse for violation of Title VII any more than the prejudices of the
employer himself.
Perhaps the only time when customer preference may be considered
as providing a bona fide occupational qualification would be in the
limited employment situations in which the services to be rendered
involve physical contact with the customer so that the customer would
prefer to be serviced by a person of the same sex for reasons of modesty
or a desire for privacy. Even then, the bona fide occupational qualification
provision is not applicable unless the job is one in which men employees
have traditionally rendered the service only to men customers and women
employees have traditionally rendered comparable services only to women
customers. Helpless female patients at hospitals are attended by female
aides while male patients similarly situated are attended by male orderlies.
A masseuse would service female customers while a masseur would
service male customers.
While Diaz and Schrichte involve sex discrimination against men,
183. Id.
184. 311 F. Supp. at 564-65 & n.8. Since this article went to press the Fifth Circuit
reversed Diaz, ruling that the exclusion of men from the position of flight attendant vio-
lated Title VII. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 3 F.E.P. Cas. 337 (5th
Cir. 1971). The court explicitly rejected the factor of customer prejudice. Id. at 340.
185. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has expressly stated that it
does not consider customer preference to be a valid defense for sex discrimination. 29
C.F.R. § 160 4.1(a)(1)(iii) (1970).
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by far the greater number of sex discrimination cases involve women.
The hostility toward women in employment is so deeply engrained, and
employers' economic interest in exploiting them is so great, that the
defense of BFOQ has been raised in Title VII cases in a deliberate effort
to obtain nullification of the sex discrimination provision by judicial
interpretation. The adversaries of equality for women were unable to
block passage of the sex discrimination provision by the Congress. They
later hoped to repeal it by interpretation. Fortunately, the courts have
not permitted this to be done.
Effect of the Sex Discrimination Provision of Title VII on Restrictive
State Labor Laws
As in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 8' many of the sex
discrimination cases involving the bona fide occupational qualification
provision have involved state laws restricting women but not men.' As
these laws collide with Title VII, the federal law, they are superseded
and rendered unenforceable as a result of the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. 88 Most of these restrictive laws were enacted near the
turn of the century when only women of low income families worked
outside their homes, and such women were completely ghettoized in low
paid "women's jobs." There was no Fair Labor Standards Act to set a
wage floor, and women frequently did not get a living wage. Women were
usually paid by the day rather than by the hour. Under those circum-
stances legal restrictions in hours and weight lifting for women did not
work to the disadvantage of those women whose lowly positions made
them completely non-competitive with men.'89
No honest justification for these laws exists today. The principle
of equality for women citizens, the only true democratic principle, has
replaced the view that a beneficent, paternalistic despotism of men should
"take care of their women." In a modern day society, state restrictive laws
for women serve no purpose other than providing a specious excuse for
sex discrimination in employment.
These laws are sometimes erroneously referred to as "protective
laws."19 Working women, however, are well aware of the fact that these
186. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
187. See also Mink, Federal Legislation to End Discrimination Against Women, 5
VALs.. U.L. Rv. 397 (1971).
188. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
189. See Brief for Defendant (by Louis D. Brandeis) at 209, 338-39, Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
190. See, e.g., 116 CONG. Rc. H7955 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1970) (remarks by Rep-
resentative McCulloch).
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restrictive laws have been perpetuated solely to exclude them from better
jobs and to keep them locked in low-paid, sex-segregated positions.
Their quite understandable resentment of these laws was well expressed
by Georgianna Sellers, one of the plaintiffs in the Bowe case and Chair-
man of the Indiana-Kentucky Unit of the League for American Working
Women (LAWW):
We were kept off of higher paying easier jobs for years
because the company wanted to "protect" us. I say it did not
protect, but exploited women. Used their hard work for low
pay, just as employers treated Negroes for years. Keep them
under foot, not on top.
.. . It is insulting for these males to use State restrictive
laws as a gimmick for exploiting us by claiming they are
protecting us. The males running the labor unions are merely
trying to monopolize better jobs for themselves.
American working women have learned the lesson that the
black people have learned. There is no such thing as separate
but equal. We do not want separate little unequal, unfair laws
and separate little unequal low paid jobs. We want equality.'
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. 9 ' is typical of the situations in
which women have brought suit under Title VII and the defense of state
restrictive laws has been made. Leah Rosenfeld was denied the position
of agent-telegrapher on four different occasions because of California's
hours and weight lifting restrictions on women. California law prohibits
a woman employee from lifting more than 50 pounds. 8 This limitation
was made even more restrictive by a regulation of the California Indus-
trial Welfare Commission which prohibits women employees from lifting
more than 25 pounds unless a special permit is obtained.' Section 1252
prohibits women employees from carrying objects weighing 10 pounds
or more on stairways which rise more than five feet from their bases.
Obviously, these laws are designed not to "protect" but to restrict
women. Yet, under the guise of "protection" Mrs. Rosenfeld, a family
191. Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments
of the Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 576-77.
192. 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
193. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1251 (West 1955). The limit is ten pounds on stairways.
Id. § 1252. See generally id. §§ 1250-56.
194. Cal. Indus. Welfare Comm'n Order No. 9-63
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breadwinner and the mother of twelve children, was denied a better
opportunity to meet her family's needs.
California's restrictive hours laws for women were also involved
in Rosenfeld.9 ' Section 1350.5 of the Labor Code prohibits employing
women over 10 hours a day or 58 hours a week. At the time of the
discrimination involved in Mrs. Rosenfeld's case, the California law was
even more restrictive as it prevented women employees from working
over 8 hours a day and 48 hours a week.' The state of California in
its brief before the Ninth Circuit took the position that women should
be required to work short hours and that they should go home early to
be with their children and to do domestic work for their husbands.'
The state's attitude thus ignored the facts of, life. It is insensitive and
brutal for a government agency to say that a woman who has heavy
family responsibilities should be arbitrarily deprived of well-paid jobs
which might enable her to meet such responsibilities.
Mrs. Rosenfeld lost the opportunity to have the higher paid job of
agent-telegrapher because on some occasions it required working over
eight hours a day, carrying ten pounds up steps five feet high, or lifting
25 pounds. Any normal human being, male or female, has the physical
capacity for such duties. Yet, Mrs. Rosenfeld was compelled by the
state to work on low paid jobs so she could go home early. One might
ask, "but what will she feed her family-motherly love and sweet
platitudes ?"
The Central District of California ruled that the restrictive laws
attacked in the Rosenfeld case were superseded by the provisions for
equality of employment opportunities in Title VII." s The effective nul-
lification of such laws is one of Title VII's greatest benefits to women.
Suits under Title VII and the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
In Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Commission 9 and McCrimmon
v. Daley,' women plaintiffs sought relief from discrimination occasioned
.)y restrictive laws by combining Title VII suits with a constitutional
attack against such laws under the fourteenth amendment. In Mengel-
koch, the three-judge district court dismissed the case as to the con-
195. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350.5 (West Supp. 1971). See generally id. §§ 1350-57.
196. In 1967 California, amended § 1350 to exempt workers covered, by the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act. Such exempted employees are now covered under § 1350.5.
The applicable statute for the case was § 1350.
197. See Brief for Industrial Welfare Commission, State of California.
198. 292 F. Supp. at 1224.
199. 437 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971).
200. 2 F.E.P. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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stitutional issue on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction and subse-
quently dissolved itself."' The single judge district court simultaneously
dismissed Mrs. Mengelkoch's Title VII action on the ground that it
would abstain, pending resolution of the issues in a state court--a most
unusual ruling in view of the fact that Title VII suits under the
statute itself must be brought in federal district courts." On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that when a three-judge district court dismisses a
suit to enjoin enforcement of a state law for lack of jurisdiction, the
appeal should be taken to the court of appeals. 0 ' On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit the decision of the three-judge district court was reversed and the
case was remanded.0 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the three
judge court erred in dissolving itself for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that plaintiff's constitutional attack" upon the California law restricting
hours of work for women" 5 was "insubstantial.""2 The issues raised in
Mrs. Mengelkoch's case have thus been unresolved, although her suit,
filed in 1966, has been before three courts.2 7
In McCrimmon v. Daley,.. 8 the Northern District of Illinois held
that a municipal ordinance which prohibited the women plaintiffs from
being employed as bartenders" 9 was "void on its face as being in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in
that it denies these plaintiffs property rights without due process of
law."21 In a similar case, Patterson Tavern & Grill Association v. Bor-
ough of Hawthorne,1' a statute 12 precluding women from being bar-
tenders was held invalid by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Three
analogous decisions involving statutes requiring race discrimination
and discrimination because of national origin declared such statutes to
be violative of the fourteenth amendment. 8
The fifth amendment has also proved to be a means whereby
equitable treatment in employment can be obtained. Therefore, the
201. 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
202. 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
203. 393 U.S. 83 (1968).
204. 437 F2d 563 (9th Cir. 1971).
205. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West Supp. 1971).
206. 437 F.2d at 567.
207. See Eastwood, supra note 28 at 292-95.
208. 2 F.E.P. Cas. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
209. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 147-15.
210. 2 F.E.P. Cas. at 972.
211. 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970).
212. HAWTHORNE, NEW JERSEY ORDINANCE No. 1137, § 6.
213. See White v. City of Evansville, 310 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Guzman
v. Polich & Benedict Const. Co., 62 CCH Lab. Cas. 9385 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Purdy
& Fit-natrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
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Supreme Court has ruled that the fifth amendment requires a union,
authorized by the Railway Labor Act,2"' to act fairly for the employees it
represents and to represent them equally and without discrimination." 5
In a recent district court decision, Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co.,21 the court applied the doctrine of Steele and permitted women
employees to join a claim under the fifth amendment of unfair represen-
tation by their union with a claim of discrimination under Title VII
against both their employer and the union since the same proof of
discrimination by the union would be required to sustain both claims.
Hopefully Title VII has increased the courts' awareness of the
seriousness of discrimination in employment and has encouraged persons
in exploited groups to seek more equitable treatment in employment
and to resist illegal restrictions by governmental action by invoking the
fourteenth and fifth amendments.
Discriminations Based on Sex Plus Some Other Factor
Defendants in some Title VII cases have raised the defense that the
discrimination was not based entirely on sex but on sex plus some other
factor. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,"' in reversing a decision of the Fifth Circuit, has fore-
closed the raising of such an issue by defendants. In Phillips, the district
court and the Fifth Circuit ruled that Martin Marietta Corporation had
not violated Title VII in denying Mrs. Phillips a job because she was a
woman with a pre-school age child.218 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that a
violation of Title VII
can only be discrimination based solely on one of the categories
i.e., in the case of sex; women vis-a-vis men. When another
criterion of employment is added to one of the classifications
listed in the Act, there is no longer apparent discrimination
based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national origin....
... Ida Phillips was not refused employment because she
was a woman nor because she had pre-school age children. It is
the coalescence of those two elements that denied her the posi-
tion she desired.1 9
214. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1964).
215. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
216. 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
217. 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
218. 411 F2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), affirming 58 CCH Lab. Cas. 9152 (M.D. Fla.
1968).
219. 416 F.2d at 1260 (emphasis in original).
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The fallacy of the Fifth Circuit's theory was pointed out in an
amicus curiae brief filed before the Supreme Court:
Race, color, religion, sex, and national origin are [by Title
VII] excluded as permissible job qualifications. The employer
and all his employment policies must in effect be blind to each
of these characteristics of the individual applicant or employee.
Any other interpretation subverts the very purpose of the
law. If the addition of a second qualification to a protected
class can exempt an employer policy or practice from the pro-
hibitions against nondiscrimination, then Catholics with more
than two children can be discriminated against, blacks can be
required to pass a special stringent test to qualify for a job,
and Spanish-surnamed Americans can be required to have PhD's
in English. Any employer could easily dream up ways to con-
tinue to give job preferences to a favored class (e.g. white
males) by adding a job qualification, relevant or irrelevant,
for applicants of the protected classes he wishes to exclude.22
The short per curiam decision of the Supreme Court disposed of
the "sex plus" theory by simply pointing out that Title VII "requires
that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex" and concluding that the court of appeals erred
in construing the Act "as permitting one hiring policy for women and
another for men--each having pre-school age children." ''
The issue as to whether sex plus other factors could be asserted as
a defense has also been presented in situations in which it was claimed
that sex plus marriage was ground for discharging women stewardesses
or flight attendants. In Lansdale v. Air Line Pilot Association,"' the
Fifth Circuit held that sex plus being married were not proper grounds
for the discharge of married airline stewardesses and reversed a district
court decision which interestingly enough had relied on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Phillips.22  The Northern District of Illinois in
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,224 and the District of Colorado in
Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc.225 held that stewardesses discharged
220. Brief of Human Rights for Women, Inc., as Amicus Curiae. Human Rights:
for Women Inc., Washington, D. C., is a non-profit corporation which provides legal
assistance without charge to women seeking to invoke their rights under the Constitu-
tion and under statutory provisions.
221. 91 S. Ct. at 498.
222. 431 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970).
223. 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
224. 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
225. 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970).
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because of their sex plus the fact that they were married were entitled to
relief under Title VII by injunction against future violations, reinstate-
ment and back pay.228 The defense that sex discrimination is no longer
sex discrimination when coupled with some other basis of discrimination
is specious and illogical, and these recent decisions have properly held it
invalid.
Mootness as a Defense
In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,27 mentioned above,22 the
Central District of California ruled that California's state restrictive
laws"9 under which Mrs. Rosenfeld had been denied employment as
agent-telegrapher were superseded by the sex discrimination provision
of Title VII as a result of the supremacy clause. The position which
was denied to Mrs. Rosenfeld was at the defendant company's Thermal,
California, facility. The record, however, showed that in 1954 Mrs.
Rosenfeld had bid on a similar position at Saugus, California. She had
been assigned to that position but was discharged from it because of the
same restrictive laws involved in her Title VII suit. The defendants
appealed the district court's decision in favor of Mrs. Rosenfeld to the
Ninth Circuit.
On January 7, 1971, more than two years subsequent to the district
court's decision, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court "to consider whether plaintiff's case became moot when the Thermal
station was closed" on July 15, 1968.2"0
There is no precedent foi holding a case moot under such cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the company closed its
Thermal facility. The district court had ordered that the company con-
sider Mrs. Rosenfeld in the future
for any position sought by her . . . without regard to her sex
and without regard to any limitation imposed on employers in
the employment of female employees under or pursuant to
Sections 1171 through 1256 and 1350 through 1357 of the
California Labor Code or any administrative regulations issued
pursuant thereto .... 21
226. Cf. Note, Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the Dependent Care De-
duction, 5 VA. U.L REv. 415 (1971).
227. 292 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
228. See notes 192-99 supra and accompanying text.
229. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1171-1256, 1350-57 (1955).
230. 3 F.E.P. Cas. 130 (9th Cir. 1971).
231. 293 F. Supp. at 1227.
366
Berger: Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
The relief granted, therefore, was not confined to the Thermal station,
and Mrs. Rosenfeld's need for such relief was just as great whether the
Thermal facility was closed or open. The district court had also enjoined
Southern Pacific from commiting further discrimination by relying on
the state restrictive laws."'2 This injunction was necessary in order tc
give the plaintiff complete relief and to protect her if she applied for other
jobs from which she might be illegally excluded. The "mootness" plea
should thus be regarded as invalid on its face in light of the district
court's ruling.
The mootness plea should also be rejected since there is an exceed-
ingly important public interest involved in expeditiously resolving legal
issues in Title VII cases. The Seventh Circuit aptly pointed this out in
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. : 33
A suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action
as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a
class characteristic, i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin. In
our view, it is indistinguishable on this point from actions
under Title II relating to discrimination in public accommoda-
tions. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.
400-402 . . . (1968), the court held that since vindication
of the public interest is dependent upon private suits, the
suits are private in form only and a plaintiff who obtains an
injunction does so "as a 'private attorney general', vindicating
a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968),
and Jenkins v. United Gas Corporation, 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th
Cir. 1968), hold similarly as to Title VII actions regarding
racial discrimination. We agree with the Fifth Circuit and
perceive no reason under the law or the cases why the same
should not be true of Title VII actions against sex discrimina-
tion. 2 '
Because of the important public interest involved in the Rosenfeld
case, the Supreme Court's decision in Walling v. James V. Reuter,
Inc.'85 is directly in point. In that case the Court held that even the
complete dissolution of a corporation which had been subjected to an
injunction for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not
232. Id. at 1225-26.
233. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
234. Id. at 719-20.
235. 321 U.S. 671 (1944).
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invalidate the ground for granting the injunction or make the case
against the corporation moot. In reaching this conclusion the Court said:
Not only is such an injunction enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings against the corporation, its agents and officers, and
those individuals associated with it in the conduct of its
business . . . but it may also, in appropriate circumstances,
be enforced against those to whom the business may have
been transferred, whether as a means of evading the judgment
or for other reasons. The vitality of the judgment in such a
case survives the dissolution of the corporate defendant ...
And these principles may be applied in fuller measure in
furtherance of the public interest, which here the petitioner
represents, than if only private interest were involved."'
The principle of Reuter applies a fortiori in this case. It would seem
that the closing of one small part of the defendant corporation's business
operations should not render Mrs. Rosenfeld's case moot when it involves
an important public interest which Mrs. Rosenfeld has attempted to
vindicate in court acting as a "private attorney general." In any event,
the Rosenfeld case is now pending before the same district court which
originally decided it to determine whether the case is moot. The court
of appeals has not decided any of the substantive issues presented in the
appeal of this case.
Other Potential Affirmative Defenses to Title VII Actions
Section 703 (h) of Title VII provides:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter,
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privilege§ of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test
provided that such test, its administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
236. Id. at 674-75.
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of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in deter-
mining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.23
Employment policies based on a bona fide seniority system, a
bona fide merit system, a bona fide system based on an individual's
productivity on the job, or a bona fide ability test which reveals the in-
dividual's ability to perform the job in question are obviously not
discriminatory on the basis of sex or on the other prohibited grounds of
discrimination. As Senator Hubert H. Humphrey pointed out during
the Senate discussion of section 703(h), that provision "does not narrow
the application of the title, but merely clarifies its original present
intent and effect."2 ' By its very phraseology this provision makes it
clear that it is not a loophole for discrimination. If the employment
practice or policy is "discriminatory," it cannot be "bona fide." ' 9
The courts have on most occasions followed several specific standards
in determining what systems are non-discriminatory.
1) The system under which distinctions in employment may be
legally made must be neutral on its face. As the Supreme Court pointed
out in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,2" ° an employment policy which
specifically differentiates on the basis of sex cannot stand.
2) The system though neutral on its face is violative of Title VII
if it has the effect of perpetuating the effects of past discriminations.24'
A seniority system which prior to the effective date of the Act had
different seniority lines for men and women with all women excluded
from the better jobs because of their sex does not become a valid legal
system when the phraseology of sex identification in the collective
bargaining contract is merely changed from "male" or "female" to some
other characterization, and the basic difference in treatment of men
and women employees continues unchanged. To illustrate, if women were
not permitted to accrue department seniority in a department where the
jobs were designated as "male" jobs, a change in the name of the job
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
238. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 302.
239. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Volger, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969) ; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968).
240. 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
241. 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
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would not eliminate the discrimination because the women would still
have no department seniority in that particular job and would be barred
from it because of the residual effects of past discrimination.
A growing number of cases have held that a system neutral on its
face is violative of the Act if it perpetuates the effects of past discrimina-
tion, even though the discriminatory practice began before the effective
date of the Act.2"2 In cases where the discriminatees under a system of
department seniority have been denied access to work in certain depart-
ments, the courts have usually ordered that the affected group of
employees be permitted to transfer to the departments from which they
have been excluded on the basis of their plant seniority.4 '
3) The system or test must be based on criteria relevant to the job
in question and the individual employee's ability to perform it. An
employer has a right to employ those who are best qualified to perform
the duties of the job involved since this is a matter of "business
necessity."' " In Local 189, United Papermakers & Paper'workers v.
United States,24 it was pointed out that under the theory of "business
necessity," an employer could require that the employees placed in
secretarial positions be able to type proficiently even though this might
mean that disadvantaged black persons who had no training in this field
would be excluded.24 Similarly, a job that required lifting of one
hundred pound weights might be one from which a large number of
242. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971); Parkham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429
F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970) ; Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) ;
Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Hicks v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971) ; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
243. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971) ; Irvin v.
Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ; Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 2
F.E.P. Cas. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Robinson v. P. Lorillard Corp., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 465,
(M.D.N.C. 1970); United States v. Continental Can Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 1044 (E.D.
Va. 1970) ; United States v. Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39
(E.D. La.), affirmed, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
244. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971), the Supreme Court ex-
pressed an explanation of "business necessity":
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business neces-
sity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes [or other
members of a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.
Id. at 853. Thus, "business necessity" cannot be claimed by an employer unless the
claim is based on an employment practice established for the purpose of selecting the
person who is best qualified as an individual for the job in question
245. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
246. Id. at 988-89.
Berger: Equal Pay, Equal Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
women as well as many men could be excluded, but an employer could
nonetheless submit job applicants to tests to determine the individual
applicant's ability to perform the required duties. The defense that a
discriminatory system is permissible because of "business necessity"
cannot be extended to other types of situations or to any situation that
would permit the bigotry of either the employer or his employees to
determine employment policies. For example, an employer's claim that
his male employees disliked female supervisors is not a proper basis for
the "business necessity" defense.
4) The system of hiring or job assignment must be applied on an
individual basis and not on the basis of sex (or race, etc.). It may not
be based on stereotyped conclusions that women as a group are inferior
as employees.247
The provision of section 703(h) that states that "[i]t shall not
be an unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer to differentiate
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or com-
pensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions" of the Equal Pay Act . 8
simply means that the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act must be
interpreted consistently in situations where they overlap by offering
remedies for the same type of discrimination. Therefore, paying a woman
less than a man in a situation where the work of the man requires greater
skill, effort or responsibility is not a violation of Title VII or of the
Equal Pay Act.249
CASES IN WHICH COMBINED TITLE VII AND EQUAL PAY ACTIONS
ARE APPROPRIATE
A woman job applicant or employee who has been discriminated
against in hiring, promotion or job assignment because of sex should
consider bringing a suit under Title VII because of the coverage of the
sex provision of that Act.22 If the aggrieved person lives in a state
which has a state or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment
practice alleged and authorizing such state or local authority to grant
or seek relief, the aggrieved person must first proceed under the local or
247. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See note 129 supra and
accompanying text.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
249. See Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 232, 254-55 (1965).
250. The proper representative of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
should be contacted for further information.
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state law.2"' If the aggrieved person believes that she has been discrim-
inated against in wage payments because of her sex, i.e., men who
perform equal work involving equal skill, effort and responsibility
receive higher wages, she should contact the Administrator of the Wage-
Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor since her
remedy can probably best be obtained under the Equal Pay Act.
In many instances, however, the aggrieved woman employee is one
of a large group of women who have been discriminated against both
under the Equal Pay Act and the sex discrimination provision of Title
VII. Such a situation would occur in the following described hypothetical
case: The women employees of the X Company are employed perform-
ing Job A along with men employees who receive 500 per hour more
than the women. The work of women and men on Job A is equal under
the standards of the Equal Pay Act. The X Company, fearing government
sanctions and realizing that legal violations have occurred, transfers all
the men employees from Job A to Job B, a job from which women are
excluded. Job B pays 500 to 600 more than the women working on
Job A receive. No women were considered for this transfer which, of
course, would have meant a promotion for them.
In such a case the X Company has committed violations of the
Equal Pay Act, and the women employees are entitled to have their
wages raised 500 per hour and back pay under that Act. Under section
16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,25 they are also entitled to an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. However, their employer,
the X Company, has also violated Title VII by offering job opportunities
in Job B to men only and excluding women from consideration. Accord-
ingly, it would be to the advantage of these women to pursue their
remedies under both Acts.
CONCLUSION
Sex discrimination is more prevalent than any other kind of employ-
ment discrimination. Like men in minority groups, women are frequently
barred from the better jobs and the better employment opportunities. In
addition women have frequently been assigned to work side by side
with men who are performing substantially the same work but are paid
higher wages simply because they are men. Employers who have con-
sistently exploited women consider that they have a vested right to
continue to do so. Male dominated labor unions consider that their male
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
252. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
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members have a vested right in the better jobs and that women should
be kept out of the way and "in their place."
The Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
will be most helpful in eliminating the injustices to working women.
Many of the courts have begun to give these laws the liberal interpreta-
tion to which they are entitled. Sex discrimination like race discrimina-
tion is immoral as well as illegal. The judicial decisions regarding racial
discrimination are directly in point in sex discrimnation cases. It is to
be hoped that women who are the victims of discrimination and their
attorneys will utilize these laws and the favorable decisions under them
to the fullest extent.
Women victims of discrimination have been so helpless for so long
that they were powerless to effectively fight for their rights protected by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. These rights are not lost by default.
Under any proper construction of the law, women are protected by the
Constitution from any governmental sex-based restrictions in their
employment rights. Hopefully, women will fight vigorously to eliminate
both private and governmental discriminations by use of existing laws
and constitutional provisions and will demand equal treatment in employ-
ment with no differentiations whatsoever on the basis of sex.
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